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Investigating variations in cost performance of English mental health care providers 
Abstract  
Background 
Despite limited resources in mental health care, there is little research exploring variations in 
cost performance across mental health care providers. In England, a prospective payment 
system for mental health care based on patient needs has been introduced with the potential to 
incentivise providers to control costs. The units of payment under the new system are 21 care 
clusters.  Patients are allocated to a cluster by clinicians, and each cluster has a maximum review 
period. 
Aims of the Study 
The aim of this research is to explain variations in cluster costs between mental health providers 
using observable patient demographic, need, social and treatment variables. We also investigate 
if provider-level variables explain differences in costs.  The residual variation in cluster costs 
is compared across providers to provide insights into which providers may gain or lose under 
the new financial regime. 
Methods 
The main data source is the Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS) for England for the 
years 2011/12 and 2012/13.  Our unit of observation is the period of time spent in a care cluster 
and costs associated with the cluster review period are calculated from NHS Reference Cost 
data.  Costs are modelled using multi-level log-linear and generalised linear models.  The 
residual variation in costs at the provider level is quantified using Empirical Bayes estimates 
and comparative standard errors used to rank and compare providers. 
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Results 
There are wide variations in costs across providers.  Characteristics associated with higher costs 
include older age, black ethnicity, admission under the Mental Health Act, and higher need as 
reflected in the care clusters.  Provider type, size, occupancy and the proportion of formal 
admissions at the provider-level are also found to be significantly associated with costs.  After 
controlling for patient- and provider-level variables, significant residual variation in costs 
remains at the provider level. 
Discussion and Limitations 
The results suggest that some providers may have to increase efficiency in order to remain 
financially viable if providers are paid national fixed prices (tariffs) under the new payment 
system. Although the classification system for payment is not based on diagnosis, a limitation 
of the study is the inability to explore the effect of diagnosis due to poor coding in the MHMDS. 
Implications for Health Care Provision and Use 
We find that some mental health care providers in England are associated with higher costs of 
provision after controlling for characteristics of service users and providers.  These higher costs 
may be associated with higher quality care or with inefficient provision of care.   
Implications for Health Policies 
The introduction of a national tariff is likely to provide a strong incentive to reduce costs.   
Policies may need to consider safe-guarding local health economies if some providers make 
substantial losses under the new payment regime. 
Implications for Further Research 
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Future research should consider the relationship between costs and quality to ascertain whether 
reducing costs may potentially negatively impact patient outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, there is little research to date exploring variations in cost performance across 
mental health care providers. Nevertheless this is an important issue that warrants investigation 
as resources are scarce in mental health care; in Europe the median percentage of the health 
budget allocated to mental health is only 5% 1. In the UK, mental health problems contribute to 
23% of the total burden of illness, yet mental health receives only 13% of the NHS budget 2.  
Therefore it is imperative that the scarce resources available for mental health care are used 
efficiently and that value-for-money is achieved. Provider payment is a key policy lever that 
can be used to achieve these objectives. A number of countries including Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the US have implemented prospective payment systems for 
mental health providers based on activity and/or treatment duration in order to incentivise 
efficiency 3-6.  
In England, mental health care is undergoing a substantial process of reform in the way 
providers are reimbursed with a move from a system of block contracts towards a prospective 
payment system based on patient episodes known as the National Tariff Payment System 
(NTPS). A block contract is akin to a global budget i.e. a provider is paid a fixed amount of 
money for a defined period of time – usually a financial year 7. The block contract or budget is 
agreed between commissioners (who purchase and organise care) and providers and is usually 
negotiated on the basis of previous expenditure 8. The use of a block contract can place 
constraints on the amount a provider can spend 7 and therefore limits the financial risk faced by 
the commissioner or purchaser of health care. Recent policy has indicated a desire to move 
away from block contracts for mental health 9,10. A block contract or global budget does not 
incentivise the provision of higher quality care or continuity of care 9 and does not incentivise 
providers to increase activity 11. Moreover, block contracts inhibit transparency as it is difficult 
to identify the costs and outcomes of services delivered 9. 
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Under the episodic payment method, providers will be paid a price agreed prospectively for all 
mental health related care delivered during a defined time period or episode of care 12.  The 
move towards an episodic payment system increases transparency around funding as providers 
will be reimbursed based on the amount and quality of care they deliver 12. However, this 
payment method shifts risk to the commissioner or purchaser of health care. 
Cots et al. 13 describe the incentives associated with case-based or episodic payment systems as 
1) reducing costs per treated patients; 2) increasing revenues per patient; and 3) increasing the 
number of patients treated. Providers can attempt to reduce costs by reducing length-of-stay or 
the intensity of services provided or by selecting low-cost patients. Revenues may be increased 
by providers manipulating the coding of patients to achieve higher payment. The number of 
patients treated may be increased by splitting the treatment of patients into multiple episodes, 
for example by discharging and subsequently re-admitting patients 13. An evaluation of the 
introduction of the NTPS (formerly known as Payment by Results (PbR)) to physical acute care 
in England found that the payment system was associated with a reduction in unit costs as 
evidenced by a fall in length-of-stay and an increase in the proportion of day cases provided 14. 
There was also some evidence of an association between the new payment method and growth 
in acute hospital activity. There was little change in quality of care as measured by in-patient 
mortality, mortality within 30 days following surgery, or emergency readmission after 
treatment for hip fracture. 
 
As part of the payment reform, a completely new classification system specific to mental health 
has been developed. The units of activity for which payment will be made under the NTPS for 
mental health are 21 care clusters which are grouped into three superclasses corresponding to 
non-psychotic, psychotic and organic mental illness (Figure 1). Cluster 0 corresponds to a 
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variance cluster which is used only if a patient cannot be allocated to any other cluster while 
Cluster 9 is currently not in use. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
Users of mental health care services are allocated to a cluster by clinicians or a clinical team, 
using a tool specifically developed as part of the new payment system: the Mental Health 
Clustering Tool (MHCT) 15. The MHCT is an 18-item tool which measures patient need in 
terms of both current problems (experienced in the previous two weeks) and historical problems 
across multiple domains including behaviour, functioning, symptoms and social.  It is 
recommended that service users be assessed and allocated to a cluster at regular intervals and 
maximum review periods have been recommended for each cluster. Therefore, under this 
payment approach, providers will be paid on the basis of the number of patients in a given 
cluster for a defined period of time or episode of care. 
Treatment reimbursed under the clusters can be provided in any setting (inpatient or 
community) in order to encourage care that is clinically appropriate, least restrictive, and cost-
effective. It is intended that a fixed price (tariff) will be attached to each cluster 8,16, which can 
create an incentive for providers to control costs and increase efficiency as providers with costs 
above the national price (tariff) potentially face financial losses. 
There is a marked absence of literature investigating the performance of mental health care 
providers in relation to costs. Rather, previous studies have investigated mental health costs in 
the context of provider payment. Research has broadly followed two strands: 1) the application 
of classification systems used in physical health care to mental health care 17-21 and 2) the 
development of new classification or resource allocation systems specifically for mental health 
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care 22-26. Results reveal that DRGs or other classification systems designed for use in physical 
health care have not been successful in explaining a substantial part of variation in mental health 
costs 17-21. The use of additional control variables such as demographics, co-morbidities 19-21,27 
as well as social (homelessness), functioning, previous costs 27, severity, and treatment 22 
improved the predictive ability of models.  Nevertheless, despite additional control variables, 
the predictive power of physical health classification systems applied to mental health remains 
weak. A number of studies 17,22,24,25 also found that provider factors influenced costs.  
Classification systems developed specifically for mental health explained up to 78% of the 
variation in episode costs 24,25. However costs driven by patient casemix were correlated with 
costs associated with provider factors, which impeded the use of these classification systems to 
inform provider payment 24. 
Recently, a body of literature 28-34 examining provider performance in relation to costs for 
physical health care has emerged. These studies have used multi-level models with fixed 28-32 
or random 28,33,34 effects, which were subsequently used to rank providers in order to assess 
performance. After controlling for a range of patient-level demographic, case-mix, health and 
treatment, socio-economic, and quality variables, residual variation in costs remained at the 
provider-level.  The ranking of providers in terms of fixed or random effects revealed 
significant differences in cost-containment performance 28,29,31-33.  
The aim of this research is to examine the performance of mental health providers in relation 
to cost efficiency in the context of the introduction of the NTPS to mental health in England.  
We investigate variations in costs across providers due to observable patient risk-factors. We 
compare residual variation in costs across providers to gain insights into provider performance 
on cost control. The motivation for the study is to investigate the extent of variation in costs 
unattributable to patient casemix or provider governance or capacity constraints. This 
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unobservable cost variation will become more pertinent if provider payment is linked to 
national average costs as is current practice for acute physical health care. In particular, 
providers with above-average costs may be motivated to engage in behaviours that reduce costs 
to the detriment of patient outcomes and quality of care. 
 
We add to the existing literature on mental health costs in several ways. We go beyond the remit 
of using risk-adjustment to explain variations in mental health costs by explicitly comparing 
the performance of mental health providers in terms of residual cost variation. This 
complements recent literature in the physical acute sector by extending similar methodologies 
to mental health care. Additionally, we improve upon existing studies in mental health by using 
a large, nationally representative patient-level dataset and exploit the richness of this dataset by 
using multi-level models.  We control for variations in costs across providers using a 
classification system developed specifically for funding mental health care and supplement this 
with a range of demographic, treatment and socio-economic variables as well as a number of 
provider-level variables.   
METHODS 
Construction of the dependent cost variable 
Each provider submits central returns (Reference Costs) annually on their average costs for 
both admitted and non-admitted care within each of the 21 clusters associated with a given 
Cluster Review Period (CRP). We compared Reference Cost (RC) data for 2011/12 and 
2012/13 by provider for both admitted and non-admitted care and omitted data for outliers 
(n=99,232) defined as greater than 4 times the cost reported in the previous (for 2012/12 data) 
or following (for 2011/12 data) year. This meant that one provider with consistently high costs 
for all clusters across both years was dropped from the analysis, resulting in 55 providers 
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included in the estimation sample. We calculated the total length of stay (days) in admitted and 
non-admitted care during a CRP. We then applied the per diem unit costs for admitted and non-
admitted care for the particular cluster and provider to this activity in order to construct a 
variable reflecting the total cost associated with a CRP. We applied the 2011/12 RC data to 
CRPs occurring between 1 April 2011 and 31 March 2012 and the 2012/13 RC data to CRPs 
falling between 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2013.  Due to the chronic nature of mental illness, 
some CRPs started during 2011/12 and ended during 2012/13 so a weighted average cost 
reflecting the number of days during a CRP in each year was calculated for these observations.   
Multi-level model 
The unit of observation is the CRP – the period of time between two MHCT assessments. A 
patient can have more than one CRP and the maximum number of CRPs per patient in our 
dataset is 43.  This means that our data is characterised by a multi-level structure with three 
levels: CRPs nested in patients nested in providers (see Figure 2).   
Insert Figure 2 around here 
Data Analytic Procedures 
We adopt two estimation approaches: 1) a linear model with the log of total cost as the 
dependent variable, and 2) a multi-level generalised linear model (GLM) with untransformed 
total cost as the dependent variable. As our dependent variable is highly skewed, we transform 
it by taking logs in order to achieve a normally distributed variable. This is preferable for 
making inferences about provider performance as Empirical Bayes techniques make the 
assumption that the prior distribution of the residuals is normal. However, in order to interpret 
the model coefficients in terms of the arithmetic mean of the dependent variable in the original 
monetary units of cost, retransformation from the log scale is required. Direct transformation 
in the form of exponentiation of the model coefficients can result in biased estimates as 
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E{ln(Y)} does not necessarily equal ln{E(Y)}35 . The use of a multi-level GLM allows us to 
easily interpret model estimates in terms of the arithmetic mean in monetary terms as it does 
not necessitate the transformation and subsequent re-transformation of the dependent variable. 
 
We estimate the following three-level log-linear model for CRP i in patient j in provider k: 
𝑦ijk =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋ijk +δZk + 𝑢k +  𝑣jk +  𝜀ijk                            (1) 
where yijk is the dependent cost variable, Xijk represents a vector of risk-adjustment covariates at 
the cluster-review- and patient-levels, Zk a vector of provider-level constraints, uk is the 
provider-level random intercept, vjk is the patient-level random intercept and εijk is the error term 
at the CRP level.  The coefficients for the log of total cost dependent variable can be interpreted 
in terms of a percentage change in the geometric mean of total cost.  For the majority of 
covariates measured as dummy variables, this is the percentage change in the geometric mean 
resulting from a change in the variable from zero to one which can be calculated as (exp(β) – 
1)*100.  For the continuous IMD Income Deprivation variable, the coefficient can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in the geometric mean in total cost resulting from a one 
unit change in this variable.   
We estimate a three-level GLM with a gamma distribution and a log link.  More specifically 
we estimate the following multi-level GLM for CRP i in patient j in provider k: 
  g {E [yijk | X
’
ijk, uk vjk]} = X
’
ijk β + uk + vjk ≡ ηijk, yijk ~ gamma         (2) 
where yijk is the vector of responses from the gamma distributional family, X
’
ijk is a vector of 
risk-adjustment covariates for the fixed effects β.  X’ijk β + uk + vjk is the linear predictor, also 
denoted as ηijk; g (.) is the link function and is assumed to be invertible so that  
E (yijk | X
’
ijk uk vjk) = g
-1 (X’ijk β + uk + vjk) = exp (ηijk) = μijk                      (3) 
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Model coefficients can be interpreted as average marginal effects. All but one of our 
independent variables are dummy variables so coefficients can be interpreted in terms of 
average marginal effects measuring discrete change i.e. the change in the total cost of a CRP as 
the independent variable changes from zero to one, holding all other variables at their mean 
value.  The coefficient on the continuous IMD Income Deprivation variable can be interpreted 
in terms of the change in the total cost of a CRP arising from a one unit change in the IMD 
score.  Statistical significance is tested at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.   
In order to compare the residual variation across providers we predict the random effect uk from 
the log-linear model using Empirical Bayes estimates with comparative standard errors. This 
approach has previously been used to measure the cost performance of providers in acute 
physical health care36. Empirical Bayes predictions combine the prior distribution with the 
likelihood to obtain the posterior distribution given the observed responses. The Empirical 
Bayes prediction is the mean of the posterior distribution with parameter estimates taken as the 
true values 37. An attractive feature of Empirical Bayes estimates is that the Empirical Bayes 
prediction for a particular provider is shrunken toward zero (the mean of the prior) due to a 
shrinkage factor that lies between zero and one.  The shrinkage factor will be closer to zero 
when group (i.e. provider) sizes are small or there is high within-group variability.  In both 
cases there is relatively little information about the group so the group mean is shrunken 
towards the overall mean of zero 38.  The posterior standard deviation is used as the standard 
error of the Empirical Bayes predictions and this allows comparison of differences between 
individual providers and the group mean of zero 39. We calculate the percentage difference in 
the EB estimates of provider-level residual variation for the best and worst performing 
providers compared to the average performing provider as (exp(𝑢k - 𝑢0) – 1)*100 where 𝑢0 
refers to the average provider. 
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The models are estimated in Stata 13.0 40 using the meglm, margins, and predict commands and 
in MLwiN 2.29 41 using the runmlwin command 42 in Stata 13.0 40. 
DATA 
We use RC data published by the Department of Health to construct our dependent cost 
variable. RC data is collected on publicly owned providers and gives an indication of the costs 
of providing mental health services.  While the RC data for the care clusters covers most 
services for working age adults and older people, some services such as children and adolescent, 
drug and alcohol, and specialist mental health services are not included and are reimbursed 
under separate non-cluster units of activity.   
Risk-adjustment variables are sourced from the Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS), 
a patient-level data set that describes specialist mental health care services.  The MHMDS was 
introduced in 2000 and since 2003, all National Health Service (NHS) funded providers of 
specialist adult, including elderly, mental health services are required to submit central 
MHMDS returns on a quarterly and annual basis.  We use Version 4.0 of the dataset which 
covers 2011/12 and 2012/13.  We cleaned the MHMDS data to remove observations that: are 
duplicates; have age coded as less than 18 years or greater than 110 years, and are treated by 
private providers. We also dropped observations (n=833) with inpatient days in the 99th 
percentile (>=48 days for Cluster 1 and >=74 days for Cluster 2) for clusters covering common 
mental health problems as we would not expect patients in these clusters to receive long periods 
of inpatient treatment. Additionally, we only considered activity reimbursed under the care 
clusters. 
 
Demographic variables include age, gender, ethnicity and marital status.  We categorise age in 
order to capture any non-linearities in the relationship between age and cost.  Ethnicity is also 
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categorised into White, Black, Asian and Other categories to represent the various ethnic groups 
in the data.  Gender is represented by a dummy variable with males equal to one. Information 
on severity and treatment are captured by variables reflecting if a patient has had care co-
ordinated under the Care Programme Approach (CPA) - a method of assessing, planning and 
reviewing the needs of a person with severe mental illness -  or has been admitted to hospital 
under the Mental Health Act (MHA).  Around 40% of observations for the CPA and MHA 
variables were missing but we coded these as zero and make the assumption that these 
observations have not likely been subject to the MHA or under CPA (as these events are well 
regulated and documented) in order to preserve sample size. We include dummy variables for 
each of the care clusters to investigate the extent to which these explain variations in cost. We 
use the cluster with the lowest cost as the reference category. The MHMDS also contains a 
geographic marker for each individual at small area level or Lower Layer Super Output Area 
(LSOA).  LSOAs are a geographic hierarchy with a minimum population of 1000 and a mean 
of 1500 43. The LSOA codes can be matched to data on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
44 in order to enable variables reflecting various domains of deprivation to be used in the 
analysis. The IMD has seven domains, of which we use the IMD Income Domain to capture 
the proportions of the population experiencing income deprivation in an area. Observations 
include those with an actual CRP that starts in 2011/12 or in 2012/13 so a dummy variable is 
included to capture the year that the cluster started in order to control for inflation with 2011/12 
used as the reference category.   
 
We include a number of provider-level variables reflecting provider governance and capacity 
constraints, sourced from the website of NHS Digital – the national provider of information, 
data and IT systems for health and social care in England. These include provider size as 
measured by the number of available mental health beds, percentage occupancy of mental 
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health beds, and whether the provider has Foundation Trust (FT) status.  We would expect that 
providers with a higher number of beds may have lower costs due to economies of scale effects. 
Providers with high occupancy rates (above the optimum of 85%) 45 may have higher costs if 
high rates result in patients being discharged early and subsequently re-admitted. Providers with 
FT status are distinguished from other NHS providers as they have more autonomy and control 
over their finances so can be expected to be associated with higher financial performance 46  
and hence lower costs. We also include a variable measuring the proportion of admissions under 
the Mental Health Act (MHA) by provider. Recent research has revealed statistically significant 
differences in compulsory admissions between providers in England, after controlling for a 
large number of explanatory variables 47 and we expect compulsory admission to be positively 
associated with cost.   
 
RESULTS 
Dependent variables 
Figure 3 shows our untransformed dependent variable – total cost for CRPs.  The graph shows 
that there is considerable variation both within and between providers.  
Insert Figure 3 around here 
Figure 4 displays the log transformation of the total cost per CRP variable, which approximates 
a normal distribution. 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables for the 
estimation sample of 681,027 observations with reference categories in brackets. 
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Insert Table 1 around here 
Estimation results 
A Hausman test confirmed our preference for the random-effects model (chi-squared (33) = 
36.86, Prob>chi-squared = 0.2950). 
Table 2 displays the estimation results for the three-level log-linear model and GLM.   
 Insert Table 2 around here 
As may be expected given the relatively large sample size most variables are statistically 
significant. The majority of variables have a positive effect on the cost of a CRP. The results of 
both models correspond closely in terms of sign and magnitude of coefficients with the 
exception of married/civil partner, which is statistically significant in the log-linear model but 
not in the GLM. Other variables that are statistically significant in the log-linear model but not 
in the GLM include Asian and Other ethnicity, Cluster 18 and Income Deprivation. Variables 
with the largest effects in both models include Black ethnicity, older age, admission under the 
MHA and care clusters 10 and 13-17. These findings echo those of previous studies 26,48,49  
In the log-linear model, Black ethnicity is associated with a 9% increase in the cost of a CRP 
compared to White ethnicity. Observations aged 63-79 are associated with CRPs that are 34% 
more costly than CRPs for observations aged 18-34. Admission under the MHA is associated 
with increased costs of almost 100% while the care clusters 10 and 13-17 are associated with 
cost increases ranging from 357% (Cluster 16) to 644% (Cluster 14). 
For the GLM, Black ethnicity is associated with an increased cost of a CRP of £185 compared 
to White ethnicity. Older age is associated with higher cost with age of 63-79 years associated 
with an increased cost of £1,123 and age 80 years and above associated with an increased cost 
of £613 compared to the age 18-34. Admission under the MHA is associated with an increase 
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in costs of £2,276. The care clusters are broadly increasing in cost within the broad diagnostic 
groupings shown in Figure 1. In particular, Clusters 10 and 13-17 are associated with 
considerably higher costs compared to Cluster 1; Cluster 10 is associated with an increased cost 
of £3,510 and Cluster 17 is associated with a higher cost of £3,828 compared to Cluster 1. The 
variable capturing if the CRP started in 2012/13 is associated with a reduction in the cost of a 
CRP of 39% in the log-linear model and £881 in the GLM. 
None of the provider-level variables are statistically significant in the log-linear model but they 
are all significant in the GLM model. In the GLM model, the number of mental health beds and 
mental health bed occupancy are associated with relatively small effects on costs with the 
former exercising downward pressure on costs and the latter upward pressure. On the other 
hand, FT status and the proportion of formal admissions at the provider-level are associated 
with sizable effects on costs; providers with FT status are associated with reduced costs of a 
CRP of £260, while a one-unit increase in the proportion of formal admissions is associated 
with an increased cost of a CRP of £231.  
Provider-level residual variation 
Around 8% of the residual variation in log of Total Cost is at the provider-level. 
Figure 5 displays the Empirical Bayes predictions of the provider level random effects for the 
log-linear model.  The graph shows that a number of providers consistently have higher or lower 
costs compared to the average performing provider after controlling for observable risk-factors. 
The provider performing best in terms of cost-containment has residual costs 71% below the 
average while the worst performing provider has residual costs 181% above the average 
performing provider. 
Insert Figure 5 around here 
17 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has compared costs across mental health providers in England and attempted to 
explain variations in these costs due to observable patient and provider factors. Furthermore, 
we provide insight into the extent to which the classification system for a new mental health 
payment system explains variation in costs. After controlling for a wide range of risk-
adjustment variables, we find substantial residual variation in costs across providers which we 
interpret as differences in performance. Our results show that a number of providers have above 
average residual costs and this indicates these providers may face financial instability if national 
fixed prices (tariffs) are introduced. 
 
Our research shows that the classification system developed for the NTPS in mental health is 
not sufficient by itself to explain variations in mental health costs and other factors are 
important cost drivers. Nevertheless, the direction of the effects of the cluster variables does 
appear intuitive, with the clusters reflecting higher severity and need associated with higher 
costs. From an international perspective, the fact that the system is being used to inform 
contracts between commissioners and providers is both innovative and progressive, as a number 
of countries have developed psychiatric classification systems but have not implemented these 
in a provider payment system 4.   
 
An important consideration for the refinement of the NTPS in mental health will be the outlier 
policy used so that any providers attracting high-cost patients, not adequately accounted for by 
the classification system, will not be penalised. A case in point may be in relation to the MHA 
as we find that the proportion of formal admissions at the provider-level is associated with a 
relatively large increase in costs.  Caution has been advised about the use of legal status in a 
classification and payment system as it may inadvertently increase involuntary treatment 24. 
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This may be a legitimate concern in England as despite tight regulation of the MHA, it has been 
suggested that the MHA is used to acquire access to an inpatient bed due to high demand 
pressures on beds 50. Moreover, research has found that some variation in formal admission 
rates is attributable to unobservable provider factors 47, which it may not be legitimate to 
reward. Ideally, the clinical or patient factors driving formal admission should be adequately 
reflected in the classification system 24. Our findings suggest that these clinical factors are not 
adequately captured by the care clusters in themselves. Research has suggested that patient 
factors such as ethnicity and age are associated with compulsory admission 47. This suggests 
that further work could be done to refine the classification system. Alternatively, the payment 
system could compensate providers for treatment of patients that are characterised by drivers 
of cost and formal admissions (e.g. Black ethnicity).  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why some providers have higher residual costs that we 
are unable to address in this analysis.  Firstly, those providers with higher residual costs may 
be providing better quality care. For implementation of the NTPS in mental health, a set of 
quality indicators and outcome measures that commissioners and providers can use in setting 
contracts are under development 16 so that quality of care will not be sacrificed in the drive to 
increase activity and contain costs.  The MHMDS contains data on a clinician-reported outcome 
measure – the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales, which is one of the measures recommended 
for use in contracts 16. However, modelling the relationship between quality and costs poses 
challenges due to endogeneity and the lack of suitable instrumental variables. Secondly, 
providers with higher residual costs may be treating a certain case-mix of patients that we 
haven’t been able to fully account for.  A limitation of our set of risk-adjustment variables is 
that they exclude diagnosis, as a result of poor coding of diagnoses in the MHMDS. Previous 
studies have found that diagnosis can explain some variation in costs with more severe 
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diagnoses such as psychoses being associated with higher costs 22,24. The clustering method 
does not explicitly take diagnosis into account and it is likely that the clusters are very variable 
in terms of diagnosis and case mix 8,51.   
Thirdly, poor cost data may lead to certain providers appearing to have above-average costs.  
Concerns have been raised as to the reliability of cluster costing data 52,53.  We find that CRPs 
that started in 2012/13 are associated with lower costs compared to those that started in 2011/12, 
which may reflect improved coding of the cost data in 2012/13.  There is a low implementation 
rate of Patient Level Information Costing Systems (PLICS) in mental healthcare compared to 
acute physical care 53. A greater implementation of PLICS would increase the accuracy and 
reliability of Reference Cost data – a necessity for implementation of a national price or tariff 
per cluster. It is intended that PLICS will be introduced for use by mental health providers on 
a developmental basis in 2016 leading to eventual mandatory use by 2020 54. 
 
If the NTPS for mental health does not adequately address legitimate reasons for cost variations 
among providers, then there is a danger of inducing undesirable behaviours on the part of 
providers.  There may be a greater response to incentives on the part of providers in mental 
health compared to physical health care 3. These could include “dumping’ more expensive 
patients and “selecting” and treating more of those patients expected to incur less resources in 
order to reduce costs. Alternatively, providers may move patients into more expensive clusters 
(“cluster creep”) and it could be argued that this may be relatively easier in mental health care 
where clinicians themselves will be the coders as opposed to acute physical care where coders 
are external.  However, the existence of a small number of clusters may mitigate this somewhat 
and the use of audit should also help to deter such practices 8,51. The extent to which providers 
may be tempted to engage in “gaming” the system may also depend on how much revenue they 
will receive from the NTPS.  As noted earlier, not all mental health services will be reimbursed 
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under the NTPS and even if providers make a loss on the NTPS services this may be balanced 
by a surplus on non-NTPS services. However, continual losses from NTPS may then encourage 
a shift away from providing these services and increased specialisation in non-NTPS services 
which may have a deleterious effect on the local healthcare provision system. 
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Figure 1. Care clusters decision tree 
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Figure 2. Multi-level data structure 
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Figure 3. Dependent variable, total cost per Cluster Review Period (CRP) by provider, 
n=51 
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Figure 4. Log of Total Cost per CRP dependent variable 
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Figure 5. Variation in provider-level residual variation 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (n=681,027) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Total cost of a CRP 3448 9783 0.99 303131 
Log of total cost of a CRP 6.92 1.62 0.01 12.62 
[White ethnicity]  0.877 0.328 0 1 
Asian ethnicity 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Black ethnicity 0.047 0.211 0 1 
Other ethnicity 0.031 0.173 0 1 
[Age category 1 (18-34)]  0.204 0.403 0 1 
Age category 2 (35-46) 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Age category 3 (47-62)   0.207 0.405 0 1 
Age category 4 (63-79) 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Age category 5 (80+) 0.195 0.396 0 1 
Gender [Female] 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Married/civil partner 0.331 0.471 0 1 
Admitted under the MHA 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Under CPA 0.411 0.492 0 1 
Cluster 0: Variance 0.011 0.102 0 1 
[Cluster 1: Common mental health problems, low 
severity] 0.040 0.195 0 1 
Cluster 2: Common mental health problems 0.050 0.219 0 1 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, moderate severity 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, severe 0.088 0.284 0 1 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, very severe 0.032 0.175 0 1 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic disorders of overvalued 
ideas 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-psychotic disorders 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic chaotic and challenging 
disorders 0.036 0.186 0 1 
Cluster 10: First episode in psychosis 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Cluster 11: Ongoing recurrent psychosis, low 
symptoms 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or recurrent psychosis, high 
disability 0.064 0.245 0 1 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or recurrent psychosis, high 
symptom/disability 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 0.028 0.166 0 1 
Cluster 15: Severe psychotic depression 0.010 0.102 0 1 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, substance abuse and 
mental illness 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Cluster 17: Psychosis and affective disorder difficult to 
engage 0.022 0.148 0 1 
Cluster 18: Cognitive impairment, low need 0.098 0.297 0 1 
Cluster 19: Cognitive impairment or dementia, 
moderate need 0.108 0.310 0 1 
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Cluster 20: Cognitive impairment or dementia, high 
need 0.044 0.204 0 1 
Cluster 21: Cognitive impairment or dementia, high 
physical need 0.019 0.135 0 1 
CRP started in 2012/13 [CRP started in 2011/12] 0.423 0.494 0 1 
Income Deprivation 17.97 11.785 0 77 
Foundation Trust (FT) 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Number of mental health beds 516 230 50 1010 
Mental health beds occupancy (%) 88.31 5.30 63.9 99.6 
Proportion of formal admissions 0.27 0.09 0.06 37.40 
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Table 2. Model estimates of three-level log-linear and generalised linear models 
 Observations Per Group 
 
Number of 
observations 
Minimum Average Maximum 
Level 3: Provider 51 489 13353.5 54060 
Level 2: Person 407385 1 1.7 43 
Level 1: CRP 681,027    
 Log-linear  GLM 
 Log-likelihood -1207545  -5897662.9    
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Married/civil partner 0.009 0.004* -13.50 8.93 
Asian ethnicity 0.026 0.010** 8.20 19.30 
Black ethnicity 0.085 0.010*** 185.72 19.96*** 
Other ethnicity 0.032 0.011** -21.13 23.11 
Age category 2 (35-46) 0.087 0.006*** 143.35 12.94*** 
Age category 3 (47-62) 0.149 0.006*** 265.49 12.93*** 
Age category 4 (63-79) 0.296 0.007*** 613.11 14.74*** 
Age category 5 (80+) 0.182 0.008*** 331.70 16.54*** 
Gender 0.010 0.004** 65.02 8.09*** 
Admitted under MHA 0.670 0.008*** 2275.57 20.78*** 
Under CPA 0.230 0.005*** 508.77 9.16*** 
Cluster 0: Variance 0.287 0.019*** 989.46 39.66*** 
Cluster 2: Common mental 
health problems 
0.377 0.012*** 765.22 23.64*** 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, 
moderate severity 
0.685 0.010*** 1369.59 20.92*** 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, 
severe 
1.018 0.011*** 2052.37 22.47*** 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, 
very severe 
1.325 0.013*** 2839.59 28.46*** 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic 
disorders of overvalued 
ideas 
1.290 0.016*** 2633.31 34.00*** 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-
psychotic disorders 
1.281 0.013*** 2600.45 26.82*** 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic 
chaotic and challenging 
disorders 
1.348 0.013*** 2879.71 28.49*** 
Cluster 10: First episode in 
psychosis 
1.683 0.014*** 3509.89 31.46*** 
Cluster 11: Ongoing 
recurrent psychosis, low 
symptoms 
1.029 0.011*** 2012.14 22.76*** 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or 
recurrent psychosis, high 
disability 
1.466 0.012*** 2983.98 25.46*** 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or 
recurrent psychosis, high 
symptom/disability 
1.715 0.013*** 3581.40 28.50*** 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 2.007 0.014*** 4282.05 32.78*** 
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Cluster 15: Severe psychotic 
depression 
1.623 0.020*** 3623.61 41.75*** 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, 
substance abuse and mental 
illness 
1.520 0.017*** 3241.07 36.05*** 
Cluster 17: Psychosis and 
affective disorder difficult to 
engage 
1.874 0.016*** 3828.30 34.60*** 
Cluster 18: Cognitive 
impairment, low need 
0.184 0.011*** 23.39 22.85 
Cluster 19: Cognitive 
impairment or dementia, 
moderate need 
0.547 0.011*** 838.81 22.91*** 
Cluster 20: Cognitive 
impairment or dementia, 
high need 
0.813 0.013*** 1788.40 27.28*** 
Cluster 21: Cognitive 
impairment or dementia, 
high physical need 
0.693 0.016*** 1646.44 34.01*** 
Income Deprivation 0.000 0.000* -0.68 0.35 
CRP started in 2012/13 -0.490 0.004*** -881.38 7.69*** 
Foundation Trust (FT) -0.216 0.132 -259.93 9.97*** 
Number of mental health 
beds 
0.000 0.000 -0.82 0.02*** 
Mental health beds 
occupancy (%) 
-0.002 0.009 25.40 0.78*** 
Proportion of formal 
admissions 
-0.222 0.641 231.32 50.10*** 
Constant 6.33583 0.820*** 292.02 1.03*** 
Random Effect Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Level 3: Provider 0.170 
0.287 
 
0.034 
0.004 
0.004 
 
0.062 0.066 
Level 2: Person 
1.769 
 
0.430 0.439 
Level 1: CRP  .  
 
  
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
